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This paper proposes a Transit Risk Index (TRI) designed to assess 
the riskiness of pipeline gas imports and to study the effect of introducing 
new  gas  routes.  TRI  controls  for  gas  dependency,  transit  route 
diversification, political risks of transit, pipeline rupture probability, and the 
balance  of  power  between  supplying  and  consuming  countries  along  the 
transit route. Evaluating TRI for the EU-Russia gas trade, we show that the 
introduction of the Nord Stream pipeline would further widen already large 
disparities in gas risk exposure across the EU Member States. The gas risk 
exposure of the Member States served by Nord Stream would decline. In 
contrast,  EU  countries  not  connected  to  Nord  Stream,  but  sharing  other 
Russian  gas  transit  routes  with  the  Nord  Stream  countries,  would  face 
greater gas risk exposure. We discuss the implications of our analysis for the 
design of the common energy policy in the EU. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For a number of years, Russia has been the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU 
and naturally, the EU’s dependence on Russian gas often has been the focus of political 
and public debates. Concerns about this dependence, and especially about the security of 
the gas supply, have intensified in the last five years as the EU faced repeated shortages, or 
even stoppages, of Russian gas. For example, during the 2006 gas crisis between Russia 
and Ukraine some Western European countries experienced a sizable reduction in their gas 
supplies. Another Russia-Ukraine gas conflict in January 2009 left South-eastern Europe 
completely without Russian gas for almost two weeks, and caused severe shortfalls of gas 
in a number of other Western European countries. More recently, in June 2010 Belarus 
threatened  to  shut  down  the  energy  route  that  goes  to  Europe.  While  the  threat  was 
implemented only towards Lithuania, with 40% of Russian gas supplies cut, EU Energy 
Commissioner Guenther Oettinger characterized this reduction as “an attack against the 
whole EU”.
1 
These episodes show that transit is a very serious aspect of the security of the EU’s 
external gas supply. The aim of this paper is to incorporate the transit dimension into the 
more conventional measure of risks associated with pipeline gas imports, and to use the 
resulting index to study the effect of new gas routes on the security of supply. 
Transit might influence gas supply risks in several ways. First, the extent to which a 
country is affected by a supply disruption may depend on the availability of alternative 
transit routes from the involved supplier. Indeed, during the 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis 
Gazprom replaced up to half of the resulting gas shortage to Poland, Germany and Czech 
Republic by increasing supply via the Yamal pipeline passing through Belarus.
2  Second, 
the configuration of transit routes may influence the allocation of bargaining power in the   3 
supplier-consumer  gas  relationship.  For  example,  Poland’s  objection  to  the  creation  of 
Nord Stream has been widely attributed to the fear that if Germany gets a direct pipeline 
from Russia, it would no longer use its political influence to resolve potential gas conflicts 
over the Yamal pipeline currently serving both Poland and Germany. As a result, it would 
be  less  costly  for  Russia  to  use  its  gas  supply  to  Poland  as  an  instrument  of  political 
pressure. In 2009 the Wall Street Journal even referred to the Nord Stream project as the 
“Molotov-Ribbentrop pipeline”.
3  Next, supply continuity may be affected by a physical 
rupture of a pipeline as, for example, in April 2009 when an explosion of a transit pipeline 
in Moldova nearly halved Russian natural gas supplies to Balkan countries.
4 
Motivated  by  these  examples,  the  paper  suggests  a  framework  for  a  quantitative 
assessment of risk associated with pipeline gas imports. We construct a Transit Risk Index 
(TRI) that combines the standard supply security factors, such as gas dependency, with a 
set of physical and political aspects of pipeline transit risk. In particular, TRI controls for 
(a) diversification of transit routes from a given supplier; (b) risk of pipeline rupture; (c) 
political instability in the transit countries; and (d) the balance of power for each transit 
route. Gas dependency, political risks of transit, and the risk of pipeline rupture increase 
TRI,  while  more  diversified  transit  routes  and  stronger  bargaining  power  of  countries 
served by a transit route decrease it. Higher values of TRI, then, imply a higher level of 
risk in the external gas supply. 
Next, using TRI approach we evaluate the EU Member States’ exposure to risks 
associated with the Russian gas supply. First, we estimate the TRI index for the current gas 
trade  between  Russia  and  the  EU.  We  observe  a  clear  asymmetry  in  the  transit  risk 
exposure among the EU Member States purchasing Russian gas. This unsurprising finding 
reflects the variation across the Member States in terms of gas dependency, the number of   4 
available gas transit routes, the political influence associated with each route, and so on. 
Further, contrary to the growing concern about dependency on Russian gas, we find no 
clear trend over time in the risk associated with the EU’s consumption of Russian gas. 
Some of the EU Member States experience an increase in their individual risk exposure 
levels, others a decrease, and for a third group the TRI does not change much. Overall, the 
picture appears rather stable over last decade, suggesting that the main complication for the 
EU’s  gas  trade  relationship  with  Russia  would  likely  stem  from  uneven  risk  exposure 
across the Member States, rather than from an overall increase in dependency. This view is 
shared by e.g. Noël (2008, 2009). 
The paper proceeds to study how the EU Member States’ risk exposures would be 
affected by the introduction of a new transit route. We take the example of Nord Stream, 
and consider different scenarios depending on the level of capacity at which Nord Stream 
operates. 
We show that the introduction of Nord Stream is likely to divide the EU Member 
States into three groups. The first consists of the Member States served by Nord Stream 
(thereafter  “NS  countries”).  For  this  group,  introducing  Nord  Stream  would  lower  the 
transit risk exposure due to better gas route diversification. However, this no longer holds 
true if Nord Stream is utilized at full capacity. In that case, the NS countries’ TRIs (and 
their risk exposures) would increase due to imbalances in the allocation of gas imports 
across the transit routes. The second group is made up of the Member States that are not 
connected to Nord Stream themselves, but that share another “older” transit route with the 
NS countries. Nord Stream’s introduction will raise this group’s transit risk exposure, since 
the NS countries would be less interested in exerting political pressure to resolve a conflict 
between Russia and the transit countries. Therefore, this second group of countries would   5 
lose some bargaining power vis-à-vis Russia in the consumer-supplier relationship along 
the “older” transit routes. Moreover, the risk exposure of this second group of countries 
would worsen with greater Nord Stream utilization. Thereby, both the NS countries, and 
the Member States not served by Nord Stream, but sharing another transit route with the 
NS countries would lose from full utilization of Nord Stream. This finding suggests that it 
is unlikely that Nord Stream will be run at full capacity, implying that the worst-case 
scenario for the second group will not materialize. Finally, the remaining Member States 
buying Russian gas would not be affected by the launch of Nord Stream.   
There  is  a  sizable  literature  that  proposes  energy  security  indicators  differing  in 
approach and focus (see Kruyt et al. (2009) or Cherp and Jewell (2011) for a review). The 
central  point  of  our  paper  -  an  assessment  of  gas  transit  risks  -  is  however  largely 
overlooked in the energy security index literature. Where transit has been considered, the 
measure is often opinion-based or simplistic. For example, Scheepers at al. (2007) include 
transportation risks in their Crisis Capability Index, but their measure is based on expert 
evaluation of risk weighted with the share of respective fuel in total imports. Le Coq and 
Paltseva (2009) approximate the risk of fuel transportation by the distance between the 
energy-producing and consuming countries. While either approach is suitable for fungible 
fuels  such  as  (non-pipeline)  oil  or  LNG,  it  would  likely  not  suffice  to  capture  the 
specificity of pipeline gas transit. Our index focuses on the riskiness of pipeline gas transit, 
accounting for diversity of transit routes, political risk of transit, risk of pipeline rupture, 
and the change in the bargaining power vis-à-vis supplier. 
Another related branch of literature addresses the future of gas transit in Europe 
using    numerical  methods.  For  example,  Lochner  and  Bothe  (2007)  and  REACCESS 
(2011) assess the economic viability of newly built and planned gas corridors. However,   6 
they do not specifically address the transit-related threats to the security of gas supply. 
Hartley  and  Medlock  (2009)  examine  the  future  evolution  of  Russia’s  position  as  a 
dominant supplier in the EU gas market. One of their scenarios studies the case of an 
abrupt interruption of Russian gas supplies to Europe. However, they do not address the 
relative effect of such a supply interruption on different EU Member states, which is one of 
the key questions in the current paper.   
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the strategic component of Russian 
gas trade with Europe based on game-theoretical approach. Most of this literature assumes 
that the dominant position in the game is either taken by Russia or shared between Russia 
and  the  transit  countries,  with  Europe  being  a  relatively  passive  player.  For  example, 
Hirschhausen and al. (2005) focus on the strategic interaction between Russia deciding on 
the gas supply disruption, and Ukraine setting the transit fees. Grais and Zheng (1996) or 
Morbee  and  Proost  (2010)  analyse  the  relationship  between  Russia  and  Europe  when 
“strategic” disruption reduced the European demand for Russian gas. In all three papers, 
Europe is considered as a price-taker in the market. Thereby the role of the EU in these 
strategic interactions is rather limited.   
However,  not  only  Russia  is  the  largest  gas  provider  to  the  EU;  also  the  EU 
consumes  90%  of  Russian  gas  exports,  making  the  EU  a  powerful  actor  in  the  gas 
relationship with Russia. In our approach we account for the EU bargaining power. To our 
knowledge, the only papers that explicitly model and derive the EU’s bargaining power in 
the  gas  relations  with  Russia  are  Hubert  and  Ikonnikova  (2011)  and  Hubert  and 
Suleymanova (2008). Similarly to these papers, we assume that such bargaining power 
depends on the configuration of the gas network. However, Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011) 
and Hubert and Suleymanova (2008) use the cooperative game theory approach to identify   7 
the power structure along the pipeline. Further, they focus on investment options, not on 
energy security. 
The paper is structured as follows. We present the methodology used in constructing 
the  Transit  Risk  Index  in  section  2.  Section  3  describes  the  data,  provides  the  index 
calculated for the EU Member States currently purchasing Russian gas, and shows how the 
index can be used to illustrate the impact of Nord Stream on the gas supply security of the 
Member States. Section 4 discusses possible extension of our framework. In section 5 we 
summarize our findings and address some policy implications.   
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
This section addresses our approach to constructing a Transit Risk Index (TRI) that 
assesses EU countries’ risk exposures associated with the external supply of natural gas 
transported  via  pipeline.  To  simplify  the  exposition,  we  first  consider  the  case  of  gas 
imports from one supplying country. Later, in Section 4, we discuss how we can extend 
our methodology to a more general case of multiple suppliers. 
Our measure of risk exposure, the TRI, includes both the conventional determinants 
of  the  security  of  external  supply  that  are  applicable  to  all  fuels,  and  the  specific 
determinants, reflecting the risks associated with the pipeline transit. 
The first group of determinants consists of the import dependency ratio, measured as 
the net imports from the considered supplier in the country’s total gas consumption, and 
the share of gas in the energy bundle of the consuming country. The former component 
represents the country’s dependence on this supplier, while the latter represents the overall 
gas dependence of the country. 
Before addressing the second, transit-related group of determinants, we need to give   8 
a more precise meaning to the concept of the transit route used in this paper. Recall that 
most of the EU’s problems with gas transit have arisen from conflicts between Russia and 
so-called transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. In this context define an entry node as a 
location on the border between a transit country and the EU. Then define a transit route as 
an entry node plus the pipeline system following this node on the way from the supplier, so 
that each transit route would be associated with one specific transit country and a group of 
gas-consuming countries it is serving.   
Now turn to the transit-related group of TRI components. There are various ways in 
which transit and transit routes could affect the security of the gas supply. To begin with, 
take  the  availability  of  alternative  routes  connecting  the  supplying  and  the  consuming 
countries. The idea here is that better diversification of transit routes, both within and 
across the transit countries, would improve the security of the external gas supply. To 
capture transit diversification our index includes a sum of squared gas import shares for 
different transit routes, similarly to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
Further, each of the alternative transit routes possesses a number of specific features 
which may matter for the transit risks. First, gas transit may be affected by the physical 
failure of the pipeline. Second, the continuity of gas supply may be influenced by political 
instability along the transit path. Third, the supplier’s decision to cut off gas deliveries, and 
the duration of a cut-off, may depend on the extent of political pressure from the affected 
consuming countries. Consider the group of countries served by a particular transit route. 
Naturally, economic or political partnership with these countries has a certain value for the 
supplier. The more valuable this partnership is to the supplier, the more power this group 
of  countries  has  in  its  relationship  with  the  supplier.  For  example,  if  these  countries 
constitute a large share of supplier’s gas market, they would possess a buyer power. This   9 
power, in particular, would allow the group to discourage the use of gas deliveries as a 
political tool should a conflict arise between the supplier and a transit country.   
Following  this  logic  we  construct  a  Transit  Risk  Index  (TRI)  for  gas-consuming 
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where   
•  c Routes is the set of transit routes from the considered supplier to country c, with 
c iR o u t e s ∈   indexing individual routes in this set, 
•  c I is  the  total  imports  of  gas  from  this  supplier  to  country  c,  and 
i
c I   is  the 
amount of country c’s gas imports via transit route i,   
• 
i
c RuptRisk   is the measure of the risk associated with the physical rupture of the 
pipeline. It is known that the frequency of pipeline rupture is proportional to the length of 
the pipeline.




c RuptRisk L PRup = , where
i
c L is the length of the transit route 
i to the border of country c, and PRup is the probability of a rupture per km within a 
considered period of time.   
• 
i PolRisk i  is  a  measure  of  political  instability  along  the  transit  route.  It 
incorporates instability both in the supplier country and in the transit country (ies).
6   
• BPi is the measure of bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia possessed by the group 
of EU Member States served by the transit route i. If a considered gas route i transmits a 
large share of Russian gas imports, the countries served by this route would have a 
substantial  buyer  power.  Further,  the  more  coordinated  are  the  buyers  served  by  the 
route, the higher is their bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia. Finally, in a hypothetical   10 
situation of a single seller (Russia) and a single perfectly coordinated buyer (the EU) the 
bargaining power would likely be split evenly.
7  Our measure considers the deviation of 
the bargaining power of countries served by route i from this hypothetical threshold:
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where  MSi  is  the  share  of  Russian  gas  imports  through  route  i  in  total  Russian  gas 
imports to the EU, and BCi is the measure of gas buyer concentration along route i, used 
to approximate the extend of coordination between the countries served by this route. 
Thereby, lower values of BPi imply higher bargaining power along a route and imply less 
risky gas imports, 
• 
Gas
c Cons is the total gas consumption in country c, 
•  c SG is the share of gas in country c’s aggregate energy consumption.   
The relative importance of the physical interruption risk, political instability or 
buyer power for the transit risk is not obvious. The approach suggested by formula (1) 
takes a neutral stand, assuming equal weight of these three factors in evaluating the 
impact of each transit route on gas supply diversification. It should not be interpreted as a 
cardinal  measure  of  transit  risk.  Instead,  it  is  intended  for  an  ordinal  comparison  of 
transit risk across countries and/or time.   
To sum up, for each country TRI quantifies the risks of gas imports from a single 
supplier, placing a special emphasis on the transit dimension. Gas dependency, political 
risks of transit, distance between entry node and the consuming country all increase TRI, 
while more diversified transit routes and stronger bargaining power of countries served 
by a transit route lower the value of the index. So, higher values of TRI imply more risk 
in a country’s external gas supply.     11 
 
3. ESTIMATING TRI 
This section applies the above framework to the gas trade between Russia and the 
European Union. The data cover all EU Member States that are purchasing Russian gas via 
pipeline, except for Estonia and UK for which complete data were not available. First, we 
address the current levels of exposure to Russian gas import risks. We compute TRI for 
2008, the most recent year for which the data are available, and discuss the evolution of 
risk levels in terms of TRI over a past ten-year period by comparing the 2008 index values 
to those for 2003 and 1998. Then, we use TRI to evaluate the impact of introducing Nord 
Stream on the gas transit risks of EU countries. We base our estimates on predicted EU gas 
trends in 2015 and compare TRIs under several scenarios. 
 
3.1. Data 
All actual data (i.e., for 1998, 2003 and 2008) on annual
9  gas imports from Russia, 
gas consumption and share of gas in total energy consumption are from Eurostat. 
The predicted data on total (net) imports of gas and gas consumption in 2015 are 
taken from the European Commission publication “EU energy trends to 2030” (2010). We 
chose the year 2015 for two reasons. First, this is the earliest possible year with Nord 
Stream  in  use  for  which  gas  trend  predictions  from  the  European  Commission  are 
available. Also, at this date, Nord Stream would be the only new pipeline in use, as South 
Stream and Nabucco are likely to be introduced only after 2015. The predicted values for 
the gas imports from Russia in 2015 will depend on the scenario, so we will return to this 
discussion below. 
We identify transit routes between Russia and the EU Member States based on our   12 
definition from section 2: as an entry node plus the pipeline system (and the country group) 
connected to this entry node. Using this definition yields nine different transit routes, with 
a number of EU Member states being served by multiple routes (see Appendix for the 
description of each of the routes).   
The data on the length of the gas pipelines come from a number of different sources: 
the  European  Regulators’  Group  for  Electricity  and  Gas,  Wingas,  the  Commission  de 
régulation de l'énergie, Kreuz (2006), and our own calculations. 
The estimate of the probability of pipeline rupture is based on data from European 
Gas  Pipeline  Incident  Data  Group  (2008)  and  International  Association  of  Oil  &  Gas 
Producers  (2010).  As  the  rupture  probability  differs  for  pipelines  with  different  wall 
thickness/diameter, we use the average incident frequency equal to 1.1*10
-4 per km-year 
for 2007.
10  Further, as we are interested only in short-term responses to gas supply shocks, 
we consider the probability of rupture per km-month, which would be roughly given by 
PRup=10
-5. 
The measure of political risk of transit
11  builds on the 1998, 2003 and 2008 Political 
Risk Rating (PRR) suggested by the PRS group in their International Country Risk Guide. 
PRR  ranges  between  1  and  100,  with  higher  values  associated  with  lower  risk.  We 
construct a composite political risk index for route i using the PRRs for the supplying and 
transit countries, so that higher values are associated with higher risk:








To  compute  the  transit  diversification  component  of  TRI,  we  need  data  on  gas 
supplies by route for individual countries. However, to our knowledge, such data are not 
available. Therefore, we make approximations based on the total imports of Russian gas by   13 
each EU Member State and on characteristics of the transit routes serving this country. 
More precisely, we assume that the share of a country’s gas imports transported via each 
route is directly proportional to the capacity of the node where it enters the consuming 
country. The thinking here is that larger node capacity helps avoid transit bottlenecks, 
providing an incentive to increase imports through this route. This logic results in the 
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where 
i
c Cap   is the capacity of node for route i at the border of country c. The data on 
node capacities are from European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas 
(2010). 
 
3.2. TRI: Current gas risk exposure 
Figure 1 shows the results of 2008 TRI estimation. Not surprisingly, there is a large 
variation in TRI among the EU Member States. This variation reflects the Member States’ 
differences in terms of total gas dependency, reliance on Russian gas, the number of transit 
routes available to each country, and the political influence associated with each route (i.e., 
the group of countries sharing the respective route).   
For example, countries like Belgium, France or the Netherlands have well-diversified 
transit and do not rely much on Russian gas. As a result, their TRI values are quite low. 
Germany has a considerable share of Russian gas in its consumption. However, it is served 
by two transit routes, one through Ukraine and one through Belarus. Each of these serves a 
group of countries that constitute a large share of Russian gas consumers, and is thereby   14 
associated with relatively strong bargaining power vis-à-vis Russia. As a result, Germany’s 




  Figure 1. Transit Risk Index (2008) 
 
 
At the other extreme there are Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia. All 
these  countries  purchase  their  gas  almost  entirely  from  Russia.  Hungary,  Bulgaria  and 
Slovakia  do  not  have  well-diversified  transits.  On  top  of  that,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and   15 
Bulgaria belong to small and non-influential transit routes.   
Figure 2 allows a view of the evolution of TRI over time.
13    It presents the values of 
TRI for 2008, 2003 and 1998 respectively. We see no clear cross-country trend in TRI 
since  1998:  for  some  countries  (e.g.,  Germany)  TRI  increases,  for  others  (e.g.,  Czech 
Republic) it falls, and for the rest the experience is rather mixed. But the overall pattern 
suggests that, with only a few exceptions (like Hungary or Latvia) TRI does not change 
much over last ten years.   
 
 
Figure 2.   
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Both of these observations suggest that the main worry with the EU’s Russian gas 
supplies is not the increasing dependency (which is the most frequently voiced concern), 
but rather the uneven exposure across the Member States. These disparities may enable 
Russia to manipulate its gas trade with different parts of Europe applying a “divide and 
rule” tactic. Our findings are in line with Noël (2008, 2009) who argues that “the problem 
is divisiveness, not dependence” (Noël (2008, p.1)). 
 
 
3.3. TRI: The impact of Nord Stream 
Now let us see how the introduction of a new transit route might impact the gas 
supply risks in the EU. We focus on the case of the planned Nord Stream gas pipeline 
(henceforth NS), which will link Russia with the European Union via the Baltic Sea. As of 
now it is slated to send natural gas to Germany, where it can be transported further to the 
Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, France and the Czech Republic. However, currently it is 
not completely clear whether any other countries will receive gas deliveries via NS. For 
simplicity  we  assume  that  the  NS  countries  group  is  restricted  to    the  above  list  of 
countries. 
We consider three scenarios that differ in (i) the share of Russian gas in the total gas 
consumption of EU Member States and (ii) the utilization of NS capacity. Under each 
scenario we compute the 2015 TRI estimates for all EU Member States consuming Russian 
gas, and compare these across scenarios.   
More precisely, Scenario 1 (labelled as No-NS scenario) is a hypothetical benchmark 
case, in which NS is not used (or does not exist, or is not completed). Further, to estimate 
the TRI, we assume that the share of Russian gas in the total gas consumption of EU   17 
Member  States  is  constant  over  time,  so  any  increase  in  gas  imports  from  Russia  is 
proportional to the overall increase in gas consumption.
14,15  This assumption allows us to 
construct  the  2015  Russian  gas  import  values  based  on  the  2008  data  on  Russian  gas 
shares, and the 2015 predictions for overall gas consumption. We then use formula (2) to 
compute the allocation of 2015 Russian gas imports across the transit routes. 
Scenario 2 (the NS-conservative scenario) also assumes that the share of Russian gas 
in total gas consumption is constant over time. However, now we assume that NS is in 
place, and use rule (2) to calculate the predicted imports of Russian gas through different 
transit routes. A typical outcome would be that the NS capacity is underutilized. 
Finally, scenario 3 (the NS-full utilization scenario) considers an extreme case where 
NS runs at full capacity.
16  Here we assume that for the NS countries the entire increase in 
gas imports (if any) is due to the increase in Russian gas imports via NS. The capacity of 
NS is shared between the NS countries proportionally to their gas imports from Russia, and 
the remaining gas imports are allocated across the transit routes according to formula (2). 
Notice that in this case, NS countries would likely “cannibalize” their gas imports through 
the old transit routes to fully utilize NS. For the countries not served by NS, the share of 
Russian gas imports is stable and formula (2) is universally applied.   
As a reference point, compare the actual TRI for the most recent available data (i.e., 
2008) to the projected TRI for the No-NS 2015 scenario. As Figure 3 demonstrates, these 
indices are very similar, despite the predicted increase in overall gas consumption. This 
result is mostly explained by the absence of new transit routes in the No-NS scenario, as 
well as by the assumption of the constant share of Russian gas in total gas imports.   
Now consider the impact of introducing a new energy route. Figure 4 presents the 
TRI results for all three 2015 scenarios: the case of NS not being used (No-NS scenario),   18 
the case of NS being used as much as the other pipeline (NS-Conservative scenario) and 





Start by comparing scenarios No-NS and NS-Conservative. Figure 4 reveals three 
different effects. First, we get lower TRIs for countries that have access to the new energy 
route. This predictable result is due to better transit diversification, as NS countries now 
have more transit routes available for use, and can thereby reduce their dependence on 
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transit countries for the security of their Russian gas supply. Second, TRI increases for 
countries sharing other transit routes with the NS countries, such as Poland, Italy, Slovenia, 
Austria,  Hungary,  Slovakia,  Lithuania  and  Latvia.  This  effect  is  due  to  the  loss  of 
bargaining power along the older routes. Indeed, the NS countries become less interested in 
exerting political pressure to resolve conflicts between Russia and the transit countries; 
they may use NS in the case of a gas disruption. Third, for the countries that do not share 
energy routes with the NS countries (e.g., Romania and Bulgaria), the introduction of NS 
has no effect.   
 
Figure 4. 
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Now turn to the effect of increasing consumption of Russian gas to the extent of full 
utilization of NS capacity. Note that in this scenario, the NS countries would be able to 
minimize their exposure to transit countries. However, as we will now see, this option is 
likely to be costly. 
Indeed,  from  Figure  4  we  see  immediately  that  the  NS-Full  Utilization  is  the 
worst-case scenario for the EU Member States that share “older” pipelines with the NS 
countries. This group faces a further increase in their TRI, again because of the loss of 
bargaining power along their transit routes. More surprisingly, the TRI index rises also for 
the NS countries. Under this extreme NS-Full Utilization scenario, these countries import 
too much gas via the NS, decreasing their transit diversification. This scenario turns out to 
be  a  bad  choice  for  the  NS  countries,  and  one  immediate  implication  here  is  that  the 
NS-Full Utilization scenario is unlikely to materialize. In turn, this implies that the non-NS 
countries’ losses associated with the introduction of NS may be not so extreme either.   
To summarize: the introduction of NS is likely to divide the EU Member States into 
three groups. The Member States that are not connected to NS, but that share another 
transit route with the NS countries, would be more exposed to gas import risk; they face a 
higher TRI whenever NS is used. The Member States served by NS would gain, unless NS 
is utilized at full capacity. The other Member States buying Russian pipeline gas would not 
be affected by the launch of the NS pipeline. Finally, full utilization of NS capacity is not 
very likely, as it will worsen the gas risk situation of both the NS countries and of the 
Member States sharing older transit routes with them. 
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4. EXTENSIONS 
In this section we discuss some potential extensions of our framework. 
So  far,  the  paper  has  analysed  the  case  of  a  single  gas  supplier.  However,  our 
approach can be extended directly to consider multiple suppliers. In this case, in line with 
the  conventional  approach,  the  index  should  account  for  diversification  of  supplying 
countries, gas import dependency and share of gas in total energy consumption of the 
considered  country  (see  Le  Coq  and  Paltseva  (2009)  for  a  related  methodology  and 
literature review). Further, similarly to the arguments above, one would need to quantify 
the transit-associated risks for each of the suppliers.   
These considerations would result in the following expression for the Transit Risk 
Index in case of Multiple suppliers (TRIM): 










cc c k Gas






TRI RuptRisk PolRisk BP SG
IC o n s I ∈ ∈Κ
=
⊧⊫ ⊡⊤ ⊛⊞ ⊛⊞ ⊛ ⊞ ⊪⊪
⊢⊥ ⊨⊬ ⊜⊟ ⊜⊟ ⊜ ⊟
⊝⊠ ⊝⊠ ⊝ ⊠ ⊢⊥ ⊪⊪ ⊣⊦ ⊩⊭
∑ ∑  
where 




c Routes is  the  set  of  transit  routes  from  the  supplier  k  to  country  c,  and 
k
kc i Routes ∈ is an individual route to country c,   
• 
k
c I are the gas imports from supplier k to country c, 
k i
c I are the gas imports from 
supplier k to country c via transit route ik, and  c I are the total country c’s gas imports,   
and the rest of notations is a natural extension of the ones used in section 2.   
Notice that the above expression for 
M













⊝⊠ ∑  
where 
k
c TRI stands for the Transit Risk Index associated with country c importing 
gas from supplier k only, as given by formula (1). That is, the index in case of multiple 
suppliers can be obtained by summing up the TRIs for individual suppliers with weights 
corresponding to their share of total gas imports and their political risks. This relation 
further stresses close connection between the single-supplier- and the multiple-supplier 
cases. 
However, the TRIM estimation typically will be limited by the availability of data. 
For example, for the EU we failed to obtain complete data on exact transit routes for all 
gas suppliers. Hence, in section 3 we chose to focus on risks associated with the EU gas 
imports from the Russian Federation.   
Another natural extension of our framework would be to address the overall risks 
of external gas supply. In this paper, we focus on risks associated with pipeline gas 
imports, in particular transit risks. However, one might also take into account imports of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). The transport of LNG does not require a pipeline network, 
so the issue of transit is less important. For the same reason, LNG is also more fungible 
than pipeline gas. However, it does require construction of regasification terminals and 
post-regasificaiton pipeline networks, which often involves large fixed costs. Moreover, 
LNG is known to be priced higher than is pipeline natural gas. At the moment, the use of 
LNG in the EU is rather limited: in 2009 LNG constituted 12.7% of total gas supplies 
(Eurogas (2010)) and in our estimation sample only three countries (Belgium, Italy and 
France) import LNG. But the overall share of LNG in the EU’s total gas imports is 
expected  to  grow,  though  sources  disagree  on  the  extent  of  this  increase  (see  e.g.,   23 
Eurogas (2007) and Cala (2008)). Thus, LNG role in the security of the external gas 
supply will likely increase too.   
Our index (at least, its extension to the multiple suppliers case) implicitly accounts 
for the presence of LNG in a country’s gas import portfolio. TRI includes the share of 
each pipeline gas supplier in total imports, and so, effectively, the remainder is LNG 
imports. The diversification of LNG imports is probably not of primary importance, due 
to  LNG’s  fungibility.  However,  the  political  risks  of  LNG  producers,  and  the  LNG 
market structure (with very few suppliers that are considering forming a cartel) may need 
to be taken into account. Thereby, the index can be extended to explicitly account for 
LNG, which may be useful in the future when its role becomes more important. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS   
This paper proposes the Transit Risk Index (TRI), which assesses the riskiness of 
pipeline gas import, putting a special emphasis on risks associated with gas transit. We 
evaluate TRI for the gas trade between the EU and Russia. Contrary to a common belief, 
the EU’s risk exposure to the gas deliveries from Russia, as measured by our Transit 
Risk Index, did not increase over the ten-year period 1998-2008. Yet, we find a large 
dispersion in the gas risk exposure across the EU Member States.   
We also show that the introduction of a new transit route, Nord Stream, is likely to 
further widen the within-EU disparities in risk exposure to the gas supply from Russia. The 
Member  States  served  by  Nord  Stream  would  benefit  from  the  increased  route 
diversification and absence of transit countries, as long as Nord Stream is not utilized at 
full capacity. At the same time, those Member States not served by Nord Stream, but   24 
sharing other Russian gas transit routes with Nord Stream-served countries, are likely to 
see an increase in their gas risk exposures. These countries would lose bargaining power 
vis-à-vis Russia, because with the introduction of Nord Stream the older transit routes 
would constitute a much smaller share of the Russian gas market. Our findings lead us to 
predict further that Nord Stream is not likely to be run at full capacity, since this level of 
usage  would  increase  the  gas  risk  exposure  of  all  consuming  parties,  even  the  Nord 
Stream-served Member States. 
These factors - the disparities in risk exposure to Russian gas among the EU Member 
States, the negative impact of a newly introduced pipeline on the Member States not served 
by  it  and,  more  generally,  the  overall  interdependence  of  national  gas  markets  due  to 
common transit routes - could well make energy security decisions at the EU level very 
complicated. Recent EU recommendations
17  suggest that supply security measures should 
be undertaken at the market, national and supranational levels. In particular, two important 
suggestions are that (1) the EU should identify a common standard of supply security for 
the  Member  States,  and  (2)  the  response  to  a  crisis  situation  should  be  based  on  a 
three-level approach, i.e. “involve first the relevant natural gas undertakings and industry, 
then Member States at national or regional level, and then the Union” (EU Regulation No 
994/2010, p.4).   
We believe that the objective of a common energy policy for the EU has high value 
and, if properly devised and implemented, a common policy can increase efficiency and 
reduce  costs  significantly.  Yet,  we  would  argue  that  the  EU  recommendations  are 
misspecified. In particular, large variations in gas risk exposure across Member States will 
make uniform gas security standards difficult to implement, a point raised also by Noël 
(2010). As for the three-level approach, isolated measures taken at the national level could   25 
worsen the position of other Member States, undermining the efficiency of supranational 
mechanisms to improve gas supply security. Thereby we argue that while gas security 
measures can be implemented at the national (or/and subnational) level, the overall design 
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Route  Transit 
Country 
Entry Node  Countries served by the route   
1  Ukraine  Velke 
Kapušany 
Slovakia,  Czech  Republic,  Austria,  Germany, 
Slovenia,  Hungary,  Italy,  France,  Belgium, 
Netherlands 
2  Ukraine  Drozdowicze  Poland   
3  Ukraine  Beregovo  Hungary   
4  Ukraine  Tekovo  Romania   
5  Ukraine  Isaccea  Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece   
6  Belarus  Kondratki  Poland, Germany, Belgium , Netherlands   
7  Belarus  Kotlovka  Lithuania, Latvia   
8    Kometi  Latvia, Lithuania   




-  Greifswald  Germany , Belgium , France , Netherlands , 
Czech Republic 
18 
Table 1: Definition of transit routes 














                                                 
1  Schwirtz (2010). 
2 Gas Coordination Group (2009). 
3  Petersen (2009). 
4  Socor (2009). 
5See e.g. The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) (2010). 
6We only consider non-EU transit countries risk here as we believe that the political risks of gas transit within 
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7So that each party has the bargaining power of 1/2. 
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9  There is a large seasonal variation in gas consumption within the year, especially between summer and 
winter. So, a possible alternative would be to use the peak consumption figures. However, we had to limit our 
analysis to the annual data based on data availability. 
10  European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (2008), p.17. 
11  Recall that for each route we consider the political risk only of the source and the transit country(ies), 
ignoring the risks of the EU Member States. Ideally, we would like to capture not only the political stability 
in the transit/supplier country per se, but also potential risks of a conflict between the supplier and the transit 
country  in  question.  However,  to  our  knowledge,  such  bi-  (or  multi-)  lateral  political  risk  data  are  not 
available. 








13  The 1998-2003 Russian gas imports data for Belgium and the Netherlands are not available. 
14  While overall gas imports in Europe have been increasing and are expected to continue so, the share of 
Russian  gas  in  the  total  gas  consumption  has  been  rather  constant  over  last  years,  see  Figure  5  in  the 
Appendix.   
15  We also assume here that the imports of LNG would not have a large impact on Russian gas sales to the 
EU in 2015, see more discussion on it in Section 4. 
16 The option of running Nord Stream at full capacity was discussed repeatedly by representatives of Nord 
Stream AG and Gazprom (e.g. by Gazprom’s CFO Andrei Kruglov, see Dow Jones Newswires, March 04, 
2011, “Nord Stream Secures EUR2.5 Billion Financing For 2nd Pipeline Stage”).   
17  See EU Regulation No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard the security of the gas supply and 
repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC (2010).   
18  The exact group of countries served by Nord Stream is not yet known. 